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Thank you to Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and 
in particular Dean Michael Scharf, for providing me with the privilege 
of delivering the Klatsky Endowed Lecture on Human Rights. Thank 
you, Milena Sterio, for your wonderful introduction.  
It is my honor to receive the Cox International Law Center’s 
Humanitarian Award for Advancing Global Justice and join the 
inspiring array of international law scholars and practitioners who have 
received it in years prior.  
I am also pleased to have the opportunity to speak today to such 
an engaged audience of students, professors, lawyers, and members of 
the Case Western community about the interplay of human rights and 
accountability in peace processes. 
1. Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Rebecca I. Grazier Professor of Law and
International Relations at American University.  Professor Williams
teaches at the School of International Service and the Washington College
of Law and also directs the joint JD/MA program in International
Relations. He holds a Ph.D. from Cambridge University, J.D. from
Stanford Law School, and B.A. from UC Davis.  Professor Williams is co-
founder of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), a non-
profit group, which provides pro bono legal assistance to states and
governments involved in peace negotiations, post-conflict constitution
drafting, and war crimes prosecutions.  Over the course of his legal
practice, Professor Williams has assisted with over two dozen peace
negotiations and post conflict constitutions.  Professor Williams has
advised governments across Europe, Asia, as well as North and Sub-
Saharan Africa on establishing mechanisms of transitional justice, state
recognition, self-determination and state succession issues, and on drafting
and implementing post-conflict constitutions. The author is grateful for
the research and editing assistance provided by Isabela Karibjanian and
Jessica Levy.
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There are currently over thirty active armed conflicts across the 
globe.2  While a small percentage of these conflicts will end in outright 
victory for one of the parties, the vast majority of those that end will 
be resolved through peace negotiations.3  At this moment, there are 
about two dozen active peace negotiations around the world ranging 
from Sudan to Afghanistan to Yemen.4  In each of these negotiations, 
the parties face the conundrum of what level of justice is appropriate 
to ensure a durable peace. 
During peace negotiations, the parties to a conflict and the 
mediators often prioritize securing peace and, to do so, try to get to an 
agreement as quickly as possible.  Historically, this left the notion of 
justice to be considered at a later time and encouraged impunity for 
leaders who may have been responsible for atrocities during the conflict. 
For instance, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated the 
Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, famously 
described then-Serbian President Slobodan Milošević as both an 
arsonist and a fireman.5  As an arsonist, Milošević instigated and fanned 
the flames of crimes against humanity and genocide in the Balkans.6 
Yet, Holbrooke believed he also needed Milošević in the role of a 
fireman to sign a peace deal in 1995 to put out the very fires Milošević 
started.7  The pursuit of justice was shelved in favor of a signed 
2. See Mark Prigg, The world at war: Stunning interactive map reveals
EVERY conflict currently active around the world, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4453666/The-
world-war-Interactive-map-reveals-conflicts.html
[https://perma.cc/V3LU-KFJ8].
3. See Virginia Page Fortna, Where Have All the Victories Gone?
Peacekeeping and War Outcomes 48 (Working Paper Prepared for
Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Aug. 2009),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9e92/99e686c49befe03bf7b863b9c8b252
55c8e6.pdf [https://perma.cc/565V-GEUM].
4. See Peace Talks in Focus 2018. Report on Trends and Scenarios,
RELIEFWEB (Sept. 5, 2018), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/peace-
talks-focus-2018-report-trends-and-scenarios [https://perma.cc/NC8Z-
DZJ6].
5. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Ambassador Holbrooke Interview on ABC’s
Nightline Transcript (Mar. 24, 1999), https://1997-
2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/990324_holbrooke_nghtln.html
[https://perma.cc/7X4X-XZB2].
6. See Andrew Osborn, Milosevic charged with genocide, GUARDIAN (Nov.
23,
2001), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/24/balkans.warcr
ime [https://perma.cc/X7LX-KMSX].
7. See Richard Holbrooke,
PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/intervie
492 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Lawyering Peace 
agreement, accommodating, legitimizing, and emboldening Milošević.8 
Subsequent to the Dayton Accords, in 1998, Milošević launched a 
campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Albanians.9  In 1999, 
Milošević was indicted for the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo10 and in 
2001, for crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.11   
When thinking about peace and justice, I suggest we should replace 
the metaphor of the arsonist and the fireman with a Wile E. Coyote 
and the Roadrunner metaphor.  In this famous cartoon series, Wile E. 
Coyote devises increasingly elaborate and innovative tactics to catch 
up to the much faster Roadrunner. Justice, in a way, is like Wile E. 
Coyote.  The odds of Wile E. Coyote catching the Roadrunner are slim, 
similar to the way that provisions for justice and accountability in a 
peace agreement are often pushed aside in favor of impunity for the 
perpetrators of crimes.  Nonetheless, Wile E. Coyote keeps trying with 
each subsequent opportunity, much like the persistent pursuit for 
justice. 
Over the course of this speech, I will examine how justice has 
repeatedly worked to find a foothold in the peace process and how the 
international community can continue to work towards embedding 
accountability into peace processes going forward in order to achieve 
durable peace.  
Era of Impunity 
Justice did not have a very successful start.  During most of the 
twentieth century, the international community treated amnesty and 
immunity as the “price for peace.”12  
ws/holbrooke.html [https://perma.cc/U5LD-MVN8] (last accessed Feb. 
20, 2020).  
8. See PAUL R. WILLAIMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE: WAR
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 152 (2002).
9. See Ivo Daalder & Michael O’Hanlon, The Roots of the War, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/readings/root
s.html [https://perma.cc/J8PH-4HQU] (last accessed Feb. 20, 2020).
10. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 22, 1999),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-
ii990524e.htm [https://perma.cc/MC5Z-K88P].
11. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Indictment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2001),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-
ii011122e.htm [https://perma.cc/9TX5-2TV6].
12. Keith Doubt, We Had to Jump over the Moral Bridge: Bosnia and the
Pathetic Hegemony of Face-Work, in THE CONCEIT OF INNOCENCE LOSING
THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST IN THE WAR AGAINST BOSNIA, at 121
(Texas A&M University Press, 1995).
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For instance, Turkish forces, who many considered responsible for 
the genocidal massacre of over one million Armenians during World 
War I, were given amnesty in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.13  Favoring 
impunity over justice with peace setting the tone for what would follow 
during World War II and beyond.  Even to this day, the failure to 
account for the Armenian genocide creates extreme tension in the 
region, including in the territorial and ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and in a continued push for international recognition of the 
genocide by the Armenian diaspora.14 
During the Nuremberg Trials that followed World War II, there 
was a brief burst of effort to bring accountability back into the process 
of building a durable peace.15  But very quickly, those negotiating peace 
agreements moved back towards a strategy that favored impunity.  
The Evian Agreement of 1962 granted amnesty to the French and 
Algerians responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians during 
the Algerian war.16  With the divisions and impunities created by that 
agreement, Algeria soon entered a brutal civil war with death squads, 
horrific massacres, and indiscriminate violence against civilians, 
mirroring the atrocities committed in the French-Algerian war.17 
During the 1980s, in an effort to facilitate transitions to democracy, 
the governments of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Uruguay each granted amnesty to members of former regimes, many of 
whom had commanded death squads that tortured and killed thousands 
of civilians within their respective countries.18 
This trend of trading justice for peace continued with the 1991 
Paris Peace Agreement for Cambodia.  The agreement did not contain 
any accountability provisions for the Khmer Rouge leaders under whose 
watch nearly two million people died.19  It would take several more 
13. See Treaty of Peace with Turkey [Treaty of Lausanne] arts.138–140 (Jan.
30 1923).
14. See e.g. H.R. 296, 116th Cong. (2019). (This resolution, affirming the
United States record on the Armenian Genocide, was passed over 100
years after the end of the genocide.)
15. See Nuremberg Trials, Hɪsᴛᴏʀʏ, https://www.history.com/topics/world-
war-ii/nuremberg-trials [https://perma.cc/7A8Q-EHK8] (last updated
June 7, 2019).
16. See Évian Accords, Mar. 19, 1962, 507 U.N.T.S. 33.
17. See World Peace Foundation, Algeria: Civil War, MASS ATROCITY
ENDINGS (Aug. 7, 2015),
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/72/
[https://perma.cc/8FLC-78SH].
18. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 Cᴀʟ.
L. Rᴇᴠ. 451, 458–61, 484 (1990).
19. See Ben Kiernan, The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The
Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-80, 4 CRITICAL
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years of political turmoil until the Prime Minister of Cambodia wrote 
a letter in 1997 to the U.N. Secretary General requesting help in setting 
up a court to try the leaders of the Khmer Rouge.20  Not until 2006—
three decades after the genocide (which took place 1975-1979)—did the 
U.N. General Assembly approve a hybrid court, established with both 
Cambodian and U.N. judges presiding over the trials for the surviving 
Khmer Rouge leaders.21  The court would ultimately convict leaders 
Kang Kek Lew, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan, among others, for 
crimes against humanity and genocide—thirty years later.22  
We can look to the current turmoil in Yemen for the consequences 
of providing amnesty in a peace agreement.  Article 3 of the 2011 Gulf 
Cooperation Council Peace Agreement called for the Parliament to pass 
“laws granting immunity from legal and judicial prosecution to the 
President [Ali Abdullah Saleh] and those who worked with him during 
his time in office.”23  The U.N. Envoy for Yemen had provided 
facilitative support to the Gulf Cooperation Council to secure such an 
agreement.24  Following the signing of the Agreement, the U.N. Security 
Council stressed the need for a human rights investigation into the 
alleged violations from the conflict, “with a view to avoiding impunity 
and ensuring accountability.”25  The U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights also quickly condemned the Agreement when it was 
passed with the explicit amnesty provision for Saleh, urging Yemeni 
ASIAN STUDIES 585, 587 (2003). See generally Letter dated 30 October 
1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/46/608-
S/23177 (Oct. 30, 1991). 
20. See U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated June 23, 1997 from Secretary-
General to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/51/93 (June 24, 1997).
21. See G.A. Res. 57/228, art. 5 (May 22, 2003).
22. See Trial Chamber Summary of Judgement Case 002/02, ECCC,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/%5Bd
ate-in-
tz%5D/20181217%20Summary%20of%20Judgement%20Case%20002-
02%20ENG_FINAL%20FOR%20PUBLICATION.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B6W6-4T3K] (last accessed Feb. 9, 2020)
23. Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process
in Yemen in Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation
Council art. 3, Nov. 23, 2011.
24. See Background, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL FOR YEMEN, https://osesgy.unmissions.org/background
[https://perma.cc/LY6D-JEH8] (last accessed Feb. 10, 2020)
25. S.C. Res. 2014, ¶ 7 (Oct. 21, 2011).
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lawmakers to ensure that the amnesty did not violate international 
law’s prohibition against amnesties for gross human rights violations. 26 
Notwithstanding, Yemen’s national unity cabinet passed an 
amnesty law in 2012 that gave President Saleh and his aides complete 
amnesty for all abuses committed during his twenty-two years in 
office.27 
Three years later, in 2015, Saleh joined forces with Houthi rebels 
to tip Yemen into civil war.28  He broke ties with the rebels in 2017, 
and Houthi forces assassinated him shortly thereafter.29  The civil war 
continues today, in no small part due to the decision to grant Saleh 
immunity rather than use criminal prosecution to permanently remove 
him from the political landscape in Yemen.30  
In 1971, Idi Amin seized the Ugandan Presidency in a military 
coup. 31  He suspended the constitution,32 turned Uganda into a military 
state that murdered nearly all political opponents, and sought to purge 
nearly every ethnic group except the Kakwas, Sudanese, and Nubians.33 
26. See March 2012 Monthly Forecast, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Feb. 29,
2012), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-
03/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_7996437.php [https://perma.cc/S6EZ-
5B8L].
27. See Yemen cabinet approves President Saleh amnesty law, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 8, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16463802
[https://perma.cc/64EC-4MWZ].
28. See Yemen’s Saleh declares alliance with Houthis, AL-JAZEERA (May 11,
2015),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/cloneofcloneofcloneofstrikes-
yemen-saada-breach--150510143647004.html [https://perma.cc/8XGH-
9FKR].
29. ‘See Yemen: Ex: President Ali Abdullah Saleh killed, AL-JAZEERA (Dec.
10, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/houthi-media-ali-
abdullah-saleh-killed-sanaa-171204123328290.html
[https://perma.cc/V2VB-A5HN].
30. See Unpunished Massacre: Yemen’s Failed Response to the “Friday of
Dignity” Killings, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/12/unpunished-massacre/yemens-
failed-response-friday-dignity-killings [https://perma.cc/28XM-6BRU].
31. See John Fairhall, Curfew in Uganda after military coup topples Obote,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 1971),
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1971/jan/26/fromthearchive
[https://perma.cc/8PXR-ERV7].
32. See Hanibal Goitom, Today in History: Idi Amin Overthrows President
Milton Obote in Uganda, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2018/01/today-in-history-idi-amin-
overthrows-president-milton-obote-in-uganda/ [https://perma.cc/WZ2C-
CAJA].
33. ‘See World Peace Foundation, Uganda: 2nd Obote Regime, MASS
ATROCITY ENDINGS (Aug. 7, 2015),
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/uganda-idi-amin-
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The estimated death count was 100,000 - 500,000.34  Tanzanian forces 
ousted him from power, but instead of facing prosecution, he was able 
to flee: first to Libya, and then to Saudi Arabia where he lived until his 
death in 2003.35  The Saudi royal family allowed him sanctuary and 
paid him a generous subsidy on the condition that he stayed entirely 
out of politics.36  During his almost 25 years in soft exile, no nation 
seriously tried to bring him to justice.37 Human Rights Watch 
unsuccessfully attempted to bring his case before the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights.38  
In Haiti in the 1970s and 1980s, Jean-Claude Duvalier, often 
referred to as “Baby Doc,” assumed power following the death of his 
father (“Papa Doc”).39  Baby Doc’s repressive reign saw thousands 
killed, hundreds of thousands forced to flee to escape the country’s 
corruption and oppressive rule, and over half of the population living 
in abject poverty.40  All the while, however, the U.S. and many other 
countries continued to financially and politically support Baby Doc.41 
Even when Haitians revolted against Baby Doc’s rule in 1985, the U.S. 
helped him flee to France, which turned a blind eye to his stay and 
provided him with a de facto amnesty.42  
milton-obote-and-the-national-resistance-movement/ 
[https://perma.cc/98F6-BGKD]; Mamadou Tall, Notes on the Civil and 
Political Strife in Uganda, 12 A J. OF OPINION, 41–44 (1982).  
34. Uganda, supra note 33.
35. See Idi Amin Biography, BIOGRAPHY, 
https://www.biography.com/political-figure/idi-amin
[https://perma.cc/6ZNV-8XKM].
36. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, The Obscenely Easy Exile of Idi Amin, GLOBAL
POLICY FORUM (Aug. 19, 2003),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28440.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/36SX-BVL7].
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Jean-Claude Duvalier: Brutal Haitian dictator
who ruled the country for 15 years, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 5,
2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/jean-claude-
duvalier-former-president-of-haiti-who-brutalised-his-opponents-and-was-
prevented-from-9776019.html [https://perma.cc/4E8A-PMDN].
40. See Nathalie Baptiste, Terror, Repression and Diaspora: The Baby Doc
Legacy in Haiti, NATION (Oct. 23, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/terror-repression-and-
diaspora-baby-doc-legacy-haiti/ [https://perma.cc/8NVV-ANGG].
41. See HELEN CHAPIN, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI: COUNTRY STUDIES
235 (1989).
42. See Fran Quigley, From cradle to grave, United States protected Jean-
Claude Duvalier, INDYSTAR (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://www.indystar.com/story/opinion/2014/10/13/cradle-grave-
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Stepping Stones: Building a Path Towards Justice 
Although many twentieth-century mediators feared that pushing 
for justice would jeopardize peace, the demand for justice persisted. 
Even in instances where amnesty provisions seemed to contribute to 
the initial peace, most of the countries later felt it necessary to seek 
justice in some form. 
For instance, after the 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti, Baby 
Doc returned to Haiti under the guise of assisting in the reconstruction 
process.43  Unlike the previous cases of amnesty discussed in this 
section, Haiti determined it could not risk accepting him back and 
ignoring his prior crimes.44  Upon his arrival, the Haitian police 
immediately took him into custody and charged him with human rights 
abuses as well as corruption, theft, and misappropriation of funds.45 
Baby Doc appeared before a domestic Haitian court in 2013,46 although 
he died of a heart attack in 2014 before the judicial process concluded.47 
In this case and in others, stakeholders began learning that to 
secure durable peace, negotiators must strive for peace with justice. 
Recently, the international community has increasingly recognized that 
securing justice helps create stable, peaceful societies after conflict 
by: (1) establishing individual responsibility and denying collective 
guilt, (2) delegitimizing institutions and war criminals responsible for 
united-states-protected-jean-claude-duvalier/17191805/ 
[https://perma.cc/WR2U-M9M9].  
43. See Joseph Guyler Delva, Jean-Claude Duvalier Taken to Haiti Hospital
after Falling Ill, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-duvalier-
idUSTRE72N5L920110324 [https://perma.cc/S9F4-7MM7].
44. Mark Memmott, In Haiti: ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier Taken into Custody, NPR
(Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2011/01/18/133021050/in-haiti-papa-doc-duvalier-taken-into-
custody [https://perma.cc/C9Z4-6PWA].
45. Amelie Baron, Former Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier dies at 63,
REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-
duvalier/former-haitian-dictator-jean-claude-duvalier-dies-at-63-
idUSKCN0HT0KI20141004 [https://perma.cc/Q3YE-QVGK]
46. The Baby Doc Duvalier Prosecution, CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, https://cja.org/what-we-do/litigation/amicus-
briefs/the-baby-doc-duvalier-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/Q3TL-
Y78F]
47. Baptiste, supra note 40.
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the commission of atrocities, (3) establishing an accurate historical 
record, (4) providing victim catharsis, and (5) promoting deterrence.48  
This switch to peace with justice, however, did not happen 
instantaneously with the case of Yugoslavia.  In fact, the international 
community was much slower to act to achieve a just peace than is often 
recalled, doing so only after embargo,49 deploying multiple iterations of 
peacekeeping missions,50 and adopting and then later enforcing a no-fly 
zone.51  
The push towards justice started first with a U.N. Commission of 
Experts led by Cherif Bassiouni,52 which found evidence of “grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of 
international humanitarian law” including “willful killing, ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and mass killings, torture, rape, pillage and destruction of 
civilian property, destruction of cultural and religious property and 
arbitrary arrests.”53  In the face of such a comprehensive and damning 
report, the U.N. Security Council was forced to pass Resolution 827 in 
1993 to establish an international criminal tribunal to further 
investigate these claims.54 Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa 
was appointed as Chief Prosecutor in 1994.55 
In the summer of 1995, just before the Dayton talks, Justice 
Goldstone indicted Bosnian Serb politician Radovan Karadžić and 
military commander Ratko Mladić, preventing them from attending the 
negotiations.56  Though the Tribunal was accused of undermining the 
potential for peace, Justice Goldstone maintained that the exclusion of 
Karadžić and Mladić from the talks facilitated the participation of the 
48. Michael P. Scharf &amp; Paul R. Williams, The Functions of Justice and
Anti-Justice in the Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
161, 170 (2003).
49. See G.A. Res. 713 (Sept. 25, 1991).
50. See G.A. Res. 743 (Feb. 21, 1992).
51. See G.A. Res. 816 (March 31, 1993).
52. See International Commissions of Inquiry, Fact-finding Missions: Europe,
UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH GUIDES,
http://libraryresources.unog.ch/c.php?g=462695&amp;p=3162820#2149
4667 [https://perma.cc/HA2N-Y2X8].
53. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶¶ 7, 9, U.N.
Doc. S/5704 (May 3, 2993).
54. See G.A. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
55. Hon. Richard Goldstone, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/who-we-are/honorary-
chairs/richard_goldstone [https://perma.cc/X6NX-S3SQ].
56. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić,, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 25, 1995).
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Bosnian government.57  Indeed, in his written account of this period, 
Justice Goldstone notes that these cases were prioritized because of the 
“persistent stories of the massacre of thousands of Muslim men and 
boys by the Bosnian Serb Army, led by Mladić.”58  In this sense, the 
Bosnians would likely not have sat across the negotiating table from 
Karadžić and Mladić, who were widely understood to be committing 
mass atrocities against the Bosnian people. 
Justice Goldstone urged Richard Holbrooke, who was mediating the 
Dayton Accords, to include accountability provisions in the final 
language, particularly terms obligating the parties to cooperate with 
the Tribunal and for NATO forces to arrest indicted war criminals.59 
Even having removed Karadžić and Mladić from the negotiations, three 
of the four signatories of the Dayton Accords would ultimately be 
indicted or indictable for atrocity crimes.60  Though the Accords 
themselves contain provisions requiring the parties to cooperate with 
the Tribunal and preventing indicted individuals from running for 
office,61 they prioritized peace at the expense of justice, accommodating 
war criminals as signatories.  In an ironic twist, the U.S. Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher titled his speech announcing the Dayton 
Accords “Peace with Justice,” even though the underlying public 
declarations of support for justice were maneuvers made to legitimize 
the arsonists of the conflict as firemen.62  
True accountability and justice proved to be timid and tardy; most 
of the Tribunal’s significant prosecutions would not take place until 
after the conflict in Kosovo occurred three years later.  Most of the 
initial individuals tried by the Tribunal were low-level perpetrators, 
57. PURSUING JUSTICE IN ONGOING CONFLICT: A DISCUSSION OF CURRENT
PRACTICE 3 (International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecution
Program, 2007).
58. RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES
INVESTIGATOR 108 (Yale University Press, 2000).
59. Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice
in the New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 953, 955 (2000).
60. Julian Borger, Bosnia’s Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal, 20 Years On, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitter-flawed-
peace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on [https://perma.cc/BSC6-
ETF9].
61. Madeleine Albright (Permanent Representative), Letter dated 29
November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/50/79c, S/1995/999, art. 8, 10 (Nov. 30 1995).
62. PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE: WAR
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 157 (Rowman
& Littlefield 2002).
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including traffic cops, foot soldiers, prison camp guards, and some 
members of paramilitary units.63  The Tribunal’s myopic mandate was 
focused narrowly on individual responsibility, and when combined with 
a fear of mission creep, it produced a timid tribunal that provided 
limited accountability, especially in its early years.64  Unfortunately, it 
also failed to deter Serb nationalists from committing similar atrocities 
in Kosovo just a few years later.65 
During the conflict in Kosovo, the Serb army, police, and 
paramilitary waged a systematic and targeted campaign of violent 
terror against ethnic Albanians.66  850,000 Kosovar Albanians were 
forcibly expelled from Kosovo and about 590,000 were internally 
displaced.67  It was not until after a humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo by NATO, and subsequent economic pressure that Serbia sent 
its former President, Slobodan Milošević, the “fireman” of the Dayton 
Accords, to The Hague.68  There, the Yugoslavia Tribunal tried 
Milošević for his atrocity crimes, although he died before the trial 
concluded.69  
Biljana Plavšić was also eventually indicted by the Tribunal for 
war crimes, but only after she had served as President of Republika 
Srpska for two years.70  Additionally, Momčilo Krajišnik, who served as 
President of Bosnia for two years, and Jadranko Prlić, who served as 
the Foreign Minister of Bosnia, were also convicted of war crimes after 
63. Id. at 114–15.
64. Id. at 119–20.
65. Id. at 120–21.
66. Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 26,
2001), https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/10/26/under-orders-war-
crimes-kosovo [https://perma.cc/7DA8-YX89].
67. KOSOVO/KOSOVO: AS SEEN, AS TOLD 167 (Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe 1999).
68. Matthew Stevenson, Across the Balkans: Diplomatic Fault Lines in the
Sandžak of Novi Pazar, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/01/10/across-the-balkans-
diplomatic-fault-lines-in-the-sandzak-of-novi-pazar/
[https://perma.cc/ST4W-BYMU].
69. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29, Decision on the Motion for
the Entry of Acquittal of the Accused Stanislav Galic (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 30, 2006); Peter Beaumont, Slobodan
Milosevic Dies Alone with History Still Demanding Justice, THE
GUARDIAN (March 11, 2006),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/12/warcrimes.milosevict
rial [https://perma.cc/VH25-98X7]
70. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-40-I, Indictment, (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia, April 3, 2000).
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serving in political offices.71  In significant part, the region is peaceful 
because those who had committed war crimes and then assumed power 
were ultimately removed by the Tribunal, but this accountability was 
seriously delayed.  
The 1990s also saw genocide in Rwanda. In 1994, 800,000 Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus were killed over the course of 100 days. 72  There 
was not a formal peace agreement after the violence because the Tutsi 
exile-led Rwandan Patriotic Front forces seized control,73 but there was 
nevertheless a stark need for justice. In 1995, the U.N. Security Council 
passed Resolution 995, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda.74  Interestingly, Rwanda was the only state to vote against 
the creation of the Tribunal.75 Rwanda objected on the grounds that 
the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction only covered crimes committed 
from January 1 to December 31, 1994, omitting crimes from the early 
1990s; the Tribunal was based in The Hague not Kigali; and the 
Tribunal would not be able to impose the death penalty.76 
Although the Rwandan Tribunal could not provide accountability 
for all perpetrators—relying on domestic prosecutions and gacaca 
courts to complement its proceedings—it nonetheless was a vital part 
of the effort to provide justice after the genocide.  The Rwandan 
Tribunal was the first to deliver verdicts against those responsible for 
committing genocide; the first to deliver verdicts that established rape 
as a method of committing genocide; and the first to hold people 
responsible for media broadcasts intended to provoke the public to 
perpetrate acts of violence and genocide. 77  In total, the Tribunal 
indicted 93 people, convicted 62,78 and made significant progress in 
establishing the international criminal tribunal as a model for post-
conflict accountability.   
71. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-I, Amended Indictment, (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, March 21, 2000); Prosecutor v.
Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, March 2, 2004).
72. Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter, BBC News (April 4, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506
[https://perma.cc/5KVX-J5TK].
73. Id.
74. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
75. Payam Akhava, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501, 505 (1996).
76. Id. at 505, 507–08.
77. The ICTR in Brief, U.N. INTERNATIONAL RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal
[https://perma.cc/93MZ-M46U].
78. Id.
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In the case of Sierra Leone, the parties agreed to an amnesty in 
their peace agreement, similar to the case of Yemen discussed earlier.  
For Sierra Leone, however, accountability managed to pierce the initial 
amnesty.  
From 1991 through 2002, Sierra Leone’s army fought against the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor and the 
collaborating Revolutionary United Front, led by a former army 
corporal, Foday Sankoh.79  On July 7, 1999, the Government of Sierra 
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front signed the Lomé Peace 
Agreement.80  The agreement granted full pardons and amnesty to 
Corporal Foday Sankoh, as well as to all combatants, collaborators, and 
members of the armed parties.81  
U.N. Secretary-General Special Representative Ambassador 
Francis Okelo was a signatory to the Lomé Agreement.82  Yet, U.N. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan explicitly instructed him to append his 
signature with a statement that the U.N. “holds the understanding that 
the amnesty and pardon in article IX of the agreement shall not apply 
to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.”83  Though the Lomé Agreement prioritized peace over more 
immediate justice, the U.N. sought to preserve the chance for future 
accountability mechanisms.  
The Revolutionary United Front failed to respect the Lomé 
Agreement.  Shortly after signing, the Front took 500 peacekeepers 
hostage, prompting the British to intervene to bring an end to the 
violence.84  A year later, a push for justice emerged when President of 
Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan Kabbah made a formal request to U.N. 
79. Sierra Leone, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Civil-war
[https://perma.cc/FX7J-6KTF] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
80. Letter to Sierra Leonean Rebel Group the Revolutionary United Front on
Peace Accord Violations, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 30, 1999, 8:00
PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/08/30/letter-sierra-leonean-rebel-
group-revolutionary-united-front-peace-accord-violations#
[https://perma.cc/88WL-BZCG].
81. Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone [Lome Agreement], July 7,
1999, S/1999/777 at art. 9.
82. Id.
83. S.C. Res. 1315, preamble (Aug. 14, 2000).
84. Unisa Sahid Kamara, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: The Case
of Sierra Leone (Feb. 14, 2009) (on file with the University of Malta).
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Secretary-General Kofi Annan for investigations of those responsible for 
war crimes perpetrated during the civil war.85   
The U.N. and the Sierra Leonean government jointly established a 
hybrid tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in January 2002.86 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, under the leadership of Chief 
Prosecutor David Crane and Chief of Prosecutions Jim Johnson, sought 
to prosecute those most responsible for the most serious crimes.  
The Court ultimately indicted Foday Sankoh, who had previously 
been granted amnesty by the Lomé Agreement, for crimes against 
humanity conducted both before and after the signing of the 
Agreement.87  Sankoh’s amnesty was invalidated, as the Court’s 
mandate included prosecuting those most responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law since November 30, 
1996, including those who threatened the peace process.88  Sankoh had 
also previously failed to disarm following the signing of the Agreement, 
and was arrested prior to this indictment.89  He died while awaiting 
trial.90 
The Special Court also indicted Charles Taylor, the Liberian 
President, for war crimes and crimes against humanity due to his role 
providing support and planning attacks during the Sierra Leone civil 
war.91  Taylor claimed immunity from prosecution as a sitting Head of 
State.92 The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court rejected this claim 
on the basis that international law does not protect Heads of State from 
85. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent
Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000).
86. Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan 16,
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137.
87. Prosecution v. Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-PT, Decision, (Special Ct.
for Sierra Leone, May 23, 2003).
88. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1, ¶ 1, April 12, 2002,
2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
89. Gillian Wigglesworth, The End of Impunity? Lessons from Sierra Leone,
84 INT’L AFFAIRS 809, 810-11 (2008).
90. Douglas Farah, Foday Sankoh Dies, WASH. POST (July 31, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2003/07/31/foday-
sankoh-dies/6e4d2d41-d756-412e-92f3-f802f9b6a91a/
[https://perma.cc/9THJ-UEUZ]
91. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement, ¶ 560 (Special
Ct. for Sierra Leone,May 18, 2003).
92. Charles Taylor, TRIAL INTERNATIONAL (last modified May 22, 2018)
https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/charles-taylor/
[https://perma.cc/BH98-V4R6].
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being prosecuted for serious international crimes.93  Taylor was 
convicted and sentenced to 50 years, which he is serving in the U.K.94 
Despite the challenges of post-conflict stabilization, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone have to a large degree persisted in peace because of the removal 
of Taylor and the RUF, including Sankoh, from the political 
environment. 
The Future of Accountability 
The current moment foreshadows a mixed future for post-conflict 
accountability and justice mechanisms.  Although there has been 
important momentum in pushing for justice, political impasse has often 
made the justice mechanisms difficult to implement.  
In the case of the Libyan revolution to overthrow Muammar 
Gaddafi there was an estimated 25,000 dead, 4,000 missing, and over 
100,000 displaced.95  In this case, the U.N. Security Council took two 
important actions.  First, the Security Council acted quickly and 
unanimously referred the case of Libya to the International Criminal 
Court on the grounds of the use of violence against civilians, including 
peaceful protestors.96  Second, the Security Council authorized a 
humanitarian intervention under Resolution 1973.97   
The ICC investigation produced three cases for “the crimes against 
humanity of persecution based on political grounds and murder 
committed.”98  The first was against Muammar Gaddafi, for committing 
crimes against humanity.99  The second was against Abdullah Al-
Senussi, for the role he played as an “indirect co-perpetrator” while 
serving as the director of military intelligence under Gaddafi’s rule.100 
93. Id.
94. Press Release, Charles Taylor Transferred to the UK for the Enforcement
of his Sentence (Oct. 15, 2003) (on file with the Special Court for Sierra
Leone).
95. Libya Civil War (2011), GLOBAL SECURITY, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/libya-civil-war.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YU4Q-ZEEN]. 
96. S.C. Res. 1970 (2011), preamble, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2011).
97. S.C. Res. 1973 (2011), (March 11, 2011).
98. Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11,
Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minya Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Al-Senussi,
¶ 1 (May 16, 2011) available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_06155.PDF.
99. Id.; Situation in Libya, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (last visited July
31, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya [https://perma.cc/4EFH-DLE8].
100. Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, supra note 98, ¶¶ 1, 2.
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The third was against Gaddafi’s son, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, also for 
acting as an “indirect co-perpetrator” of crimes against humanity.101 
Halfway through the NATO-led air campaign, some diplomats 
became concerned about the outcome and wanted to begin negotiations 
with Gaddafi.102  The international community was able to invoke the 
ICC investigation to prevent a negotiation that may have led to the 
appeasement and accommodation of Gaddafi.103  The NATO coalition 
and allied forces did ultimately succeed in defeating Gaddafi,104 who 
was killed in an act of mob violence.105  
Despite these promising signs of ICC involvement in Libya, the 
ICC’s investigations and prosecutions have been rife with political 
impasse.  Gaddafi died before his trial could proceed.106 The ICC’s Pre-
Trial Chamber I ruled Al-Senussi’s case inadmissible in 2013 because 
domestic courts were willing and able to prosecute, a decision that was 
upheld by the Appeal Chamber in 2014.107  Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’s case 
remains in the pre-trial stage.108  
In 2014 ICC defense lawyer Melinda Taylor was detained for three 
weeks by rebels in the Zintan region, while attempting to visit her 
client, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi.109  A local brigade commander accused 
Taylor of smuggling secret letters to Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and of 
101. Id.
102. See Top Diplomats Agree: Gadhafi Must Go, NBC NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42319658/ns/world_news-europe/t/top-
diplomats-agree-gadhafi-must-go/#.XkQKoWhKhPZ
[https://perma.cc/9SQN-FUPH].
103. Charles, supra note 92.
104. Libya’s Col Muammar Gaddafi Killed, says NTC, BBC NEWS (Oct. 20,
2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15389550
[https://perma.cc/5CDU-33PW].
105. Id.
106. Adam Taylor, Would Libya have been better off if Muammar Gaddafi had
been captured?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct 28 2014 at 6:00AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/muammar-gaddafi-
death-impact-libya [https://perma.cc/4LAB-C567].
107. Press Release, Al-Senussi case: Appeals Chamber confirms case is
inadmissible before ICC (July 24, 2014) (on file with the International
Criminal Court),
108. Gaddafi Case, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/libya/gaddafi [https://perma.cc/4ZG9-T2RU].
109. Thomas Escritt, ICC refers Libya to U.N. Security Council for not
surrendering Gaddafi’s son, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-libya/icc-refers-libya-to-
u-n-security-council-for-not-surrendering-gaddafis-son-
idUSKBN0JO1Y220141210 [https://perma.cc/AF3H-RH7V].
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smuggling in a video camera.110  Three other members of ICC staff were 
held with Taylor, for allegations that they shared documents with their 
client that could harm national security.111  Libya’s Prosecutor General 
ruled that the ICC team should be held for 45 days, but they were later 
released after three weeks on the grounds of diplomatic immunity.112 
With a new wave of violence that began in 2019,113 and the 
continued perpetration of war crimes during the conflict,114 the outlook 
for accountability and justice in Libya remains mixed.  
Accountability similarly faces an uncertain future in Colombia. In 
2016, Colombia’s Peace Agreement with the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) established one of the most comprehensive 
and detailed arrangements for transitional justice in a peace agreement, 
giving hope to a durable peace in the country.115  The agreement 
included the structure for a Special Jurisdiction for Peace—a collection 
of six bodies, centering around a Tribunal for Peace.116  The Tribunal 
can deliver judgements and impose sanctions on those responsible for 
crimes committed during the armed conflict, including atrocity 
110. Luke Harding, Libya frees international criminal court legal team accused
of spying, THE GUARDIAN (July 2, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/02/libya-releases-icc-
officials [https://perma.cc/T4UQ-7D9E].
111. Id.
112. Kate Cronin-Furman & Amanda Taub, Is the International Criminal
Court Facing Its ‘Black Hawk Down’ Moment?, THE ATLANTIC (June 14,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/is-
the-international-criminal-court-facing-its-black-hawk-down-
moment/258528/ [https://perma.cc/GTR5-BYW2]; see Luke, supra note
110; Lisa Miller, Melinda Taylor freed from Libyan detention, ABC (July
3,
2012),  https://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2012/s3537695.htm
[https://perma.cc/WR94-NLJL].
113. See Bill Chappell, Fighting Grips Tripoli As Libya Faces New Violence
Among Rivals, NPR (April 8, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/08/711123040/fighting-grips-tripoli-as-
libya-faces-new-violence-among-rivals [https://perma.cc/TR62-SUM9].
114. See Libya: Evidence of possible war crimes underscores need for
international investigation, AMNESTY INT’L (May 16, 2019),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/libya-evidence-of-
possible-war-crimes-underscores-need-for-international-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/GCU9-PXQ9].
115. Refik Hodzic, ICTJ Welcomes Historic Peace Agreement Between
Colombian Government and FARC Rebels, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANS. J.
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.ictj.org/news/colombia-farc-peace-
agreement [https://perma.cc/ERG4-S3G9]
116. Brian Harper & Holly K. Sonneland, Explainer: Colombia’s Special
Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), AMERICAS SOCIETY COUNCIL OF THE
AMERICAS (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-
colombias-special-jurisdiction-peace-jep [https://perma.cc/YGJ2-Y6KY],
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crimes.117  The Special Jurisdiction for Peace includes non-traditional 
or alternative sentencing options, sanctions which depend on the degree 
of truth expressed, the gravity of the act, the level of responsibility and 
liability, and reparations undertaken and guarantees of non-
recurrence.118  Retribution is reserved only for those who do not 
cooperate with the process.119  
The people of Colombia rejected this peace agreement in a 
statewide referendum.120  The rejection not only illustrated the people’s 
opposition to creating a path for FARC to become a political party, 
but also the populace’s belief that there was not enough accountability 
and prosecutions built into the agreement.121  
The hybrid accountability framework set out in the 2016 agreement 
appeared to insufficiently hold accountable those who were most 
responsible for the most serious crimes committed during the conflict.122 
Under the 2016 plan, members of the FARC that voluntarily came 
forward would be diverted into special criminal proceedings.123  If they 
gave full and honest accounts of their acts, they could receive reduced 
sentences for their crimes.124  
For too many Colombians, it appeared that this piecemeal 
transitional framework overpromised and under-delivered, especially 
with regards to accountability.125  Specifically, FARC members who 
had engaged in the decades-long violence could, through the procedures 
set forth by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, remain unindicted.126 
After the negative referendum outcome, the government rerouted the 
117. Id.
118. Final Agreement to end the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and
Lasting Peace, Nov. 24, 2016,
http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-
armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TTR-VH8K].
119. See id.
120. Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3,
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252
[https://perma.cc/4PDJ-JUDU]
121. See id.
122. Paul Williams, The Colombian Referendum: A Lesson on Peace Without
Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct 7, 2016),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-colombian-referendum-a-lesson-on-
peace-without_b_57f7d9dfe4b090dec0e71064 [https://perma.cc/X3G5-
ETXT].
123. See Harper & Sonneland, supra note 116.
124. Final Agreement, supra note 118, at 50(b), (f).
125. Williams, supra note 122.
126. Id.
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agreement through Congress, mostly without altering the provisions 
which angered voters in the plebiscite.127  
So far, peace has largely held in Colombia.  Yet, in response to 
what they perceive to be inadequate guarantees of safety from the state, 
certain factions of the FARC have recently reneged on their 
commitment to the peace process, vowing a new stage of violence.128  It 
remains to be seen whether the transitional justice arrangements set up 
in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace can bring peace with justice in the 
long term.  
In Syria, atrocities and violations of international law are well-
documented, yet there are insufficient routes for justice.  The Geneva 
Communiqué, the outcome of a U.N.-backed peace conference on Syria, 
initially called for a “comprehensive package for transitional justice, 
including compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the present 
conflict, steps towards national reconciliation and forgiveness.”129  This 
Communiqué was annexed into U.N. Security Council Resolution 
2118,130 but two years later when many of Resolution 2118’s provisions 
were embedded into Resolution 2254,131 the accountability provisions 
were omitted.  In 2014, the U.N. Security Council made another 
attempt at accountability with a French-led referral of Syria to the 
ICC; however, the resolution was vetoed by Russia and China.132  
The U.N. General Assembly tried to overcome the impasse at the 
U.N. Security Council by creating an International, Impartial and 
Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to collect, preserve and analyze 
evidence of international law violations.133  Notably, the IIIM is not 
empowered to prosecute or adjudicate cases.134  
127. Helen Murphy, Colombian peace deal passed by Congress, ending 52-year
war, REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
colombia-peace/colombian-peace-deal-passed-by-congress-ending-52-
year-war-idUSKBN13P1D2 [https://perma.cc/4APA-Y8RF].
128. Sasha Ingber, Former FARC Leaders Announce ‘New Stage Of Fighting,’
Upending Colombia’s Peace Deal, NPR (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/29/755425619/former-farc-leaders-
announce-new-stage-of-fighting-upending-colombia-s-peace-dea
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129. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., agenda item 34. at 10(d), U.N. Doc. A/66/865-
S/2012/522 (July 6, 2012).
130. S.C. Res. 2118(2013) (Sept. 27, 2013).
131. S.C. Res. 2254(2015) (Dec. 18, 2015).
132. Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International
Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from
Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
133. G.A. Res. 71/248, at 4 (Jan. 11, 2017).
134. Id.
509 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Lawyering Peace 
Though the permanent members of the Security Council may be 
divided over the potential of accountability mechanisms, smaller states 
may be starting to take the lead in demanding justice.  For instance, 
Bangladesh—where most of the survivors of the Rohingya genocide in 
Burma have fled—is a state party to the Rome Statute.135  This has 
allowed the ICC to launch an investigation of the crime of forced 
deportation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh as part of the genocide 
committed against the Rohingya.136  The investigation is narrow in 
scope, however, because the ICC only has jurisdiction over the crime of 
deportation across the border into a state party to the ICC.137  Other 
crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed against the 
Rohingya in Burma are beyond the scope of the investigation, and as a 
consequence, currently beyond the reach of the ICC.138 
States have also reinvigorated the principle of universal jurisdiction 
to hold individuals accountable for certain crimes that present universal 
danger.  Under this principle, states can prosecute criminals that are in 
their territory, regardless of the defendant’s or victim’s nationality, and 
no matter the location the alleged crime.139  Though a nascent tool, in 
2018, it was used to name 149 suspects in fifteen states.   Of these, 
seventeen are standing trial, eight have been convicted, and two have 
been acquitted.140 
Despite these encouraging developments, universal jurisdiction has 
significant limitations.  The accused must be present within a state that 
accepts the principle of universal jurisdiction.141  This principle is often 
invoked when other forms of criminal jurisdiction are not available, 
meaning that the defendant cannot be prosecuted elsewhere.142  
Additionally, there is often domestic disinterest in universal 
135. Owen Bowcott, War crimes court approves inquiry into violence against
Rohingya, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/war-crimes-judges-
approve-investigation-violence-against-rohingya-icc-myammar
[https://perma.cc/3BQJ-78CH].
136. Id.
137. See Press Release, ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, requests judicial
authorisation to commence an investigation into the situation in
Bangladesh/Myanmar (July 4, 2019) (on file with the International
Criminal Court)
138. See id.
139. VALERIE PAULET, EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES IN UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
CASES 9 (TRIAL International, 2019).
140. Id. at 11.
141. See Universal Jurisdiction, INT’L JUSTICE RESOURCE CTR.,
https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-
universal-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/RHV9-7EBX].
142. Id.
510 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Lawyering Peace 
jurisdiction, as some residents wonder why resources are being 
redirected to prosecute crimes committed beyond their borders.  While 
innovations such as universal jurisdiction and the IIIM are promising 
and necessary, they have not proven to be sufficient to secure peace 
with justice in contexts such as Syria.  
Notably, however, there is a universal truth relating to the demand 
for justice by victims of atrocities.  Last year, I organized a team of 
lawyers and investigators that deployed to the refugee camps in 
Bangladesh to document the atrocities that had been committed 
against the Rohingya.  It was astounding how oftentimes when the 
investigators would describe the project, the refugees would reply, “this 
is good, we need justice, not just food.”143  In November 2019, the 
International Criminal Court authorized an investigation into the 
crimes committed against the Rohingya.144  The Registry reports that 
many of the victims consulted “believe that only justice and 
accountability can ensure that the perceived cycle of violence and abuse 
comes to an end and that the Rohingya can go back to their homeland, 
Myanmar, in a dignified manner and with full citizenship rights.”145 
These sentiments remind us that comprehensive transitional 
justice—as hard as it is to achieve—cannot be forgotten, and it is 
incumbent on peace negotiators to carve out space for accountability 
and justice in order to achieve a durable peace.  
143. DOCUMENTING ATROCITY CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST THE ROHINGYA IN
MYANMAR’S RAKHINE STATE 105 (Public International Law & Policy
Group, 2018)
144. Situation In The People’s Republic Of Bangladesh/Republic Of The
Union Of Myanmar, Case No. Icc-01/19, Public (Nov. 14, 2019).
145. Final Registry Report, Case No. ICC-01/19-22-Conf-Exp-AnxI, ¶ 34
(Nov. 11, 2019).
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